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FoR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.* BY Walter Berns. New York: Basic Books. 1979. Pp. vii, 214. $10.95.
We have heard talk of justice. Is there anybody who knows what
justice is? No one on earth can measure out justice. Can you look at
any man and say what he deserves - whether he deserves hanging by
the neck until dead or life in prison or thirty days in prison or a medal?
The human mind is blind to all who seek to look in at it and to most of
us that look out from it. Justice is something that man knows little
about. He may know something about charity and understanding and
mercy, and he should cling to these as far as he can. 1

Walter Berns rejects this indictment of man's ability to judge his
fellow man. Indeed, he bases his modem defense of capital punishment on the need for justice. The persuasiveness of that defense may
thus depend on whether it convinces us that a coherent, satisfying
structure of justice exists - a structure that can administer the ultimate sanction justly. His effort is lucidly presented, and is an important, if unconvincing, addition to the literature.
For Capital Punishment sidesteps many of the traditional arguments regarding the death penalty. For example, Berns concedes
that religion provides little guidance. A battle waged with biblical
passages would provide no clear victor. Furthermore, he summarily
dismisses the claim that the death penalty is cruel and unusual, citing
its acceptance by the framers of the Constitution and a majority of
modem Americans.2 Finally, he refuses to engage in a war of statistics on the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent to crime.
Berns does not believe that there has been convincing evidence on
either side, and he therefore does not base his argument on capital
punishment's deterrent effect. But if deterrence cannot justify capital
punishment, then the penalty would seem to be nothing but an act of
vengeance. Yet Berns takes his stand on precisely that foundation;
he argues that revenge, or what he calls righteous indignation, is a
proper motive for capital punishment.
Berns begins his unique argument by tracing the widespread rejection of retribution to its roots, the social contract theory of the
eighteenth century. This theory, springing from centuries of intense
• This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Review.-Ed.
I. C. DARROW, Is Capital Punishment a Wise Policy? IJebate with Judge Talley, in ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 95 (A. Weinberg ed. 1957).
2. Berns cites various polls taken in the United States which show a popular majority for
capital punishment. The most recent, taken in California in 1975, shows 74% in favor. In
addition, Berns points to a Canadian study which demonstrated that even after 14 years without a single execution 80% of the population still favored the death penalty. Similarly, when
capital punishment was abolished in Great Britain, 79% of the people were against or unsure
of such action. See pp. 36-38.
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religious persecution in Europe, espoused freedom from laws that
condemned people for their beliefs. These theorists viewed man as
amoral, believing his primary motivation to be self-interest. They
assumed that each person's self-interest would clash with the interests of others, resulting in constant warfare. Therefore, they found a
society oflaws necessary to free members from fear of each other. In
such a system, only acts that harmed others would be criminal, for
the law's only goal was a peaceful society. Crimes were not morally
wrong; they were merely failures to control one's self-interest. The
purpose of the law was not to condemn and punish criminals but to
convince them that it is in their self-interest to refrain from committing crimes by threatening them with punishment. Thus deterrence
- not retribution - was the goal. The social contract theorists argued that deterrence should be accomplished by the least severe punishment necessary. They rejected traditional forms of bodily
punishment and proposed imprisonment as the most humane and
effective deterrent, thereby paving the way for the abolition of the
death penalty.
Berns claims that our modem attitudes toward crime and punishment have evolved from this philosophy. We have continued to reject anger and retribution as responses to crime, but we have also
gone beyond the social contract theorists by making rehabilitation
the ultimate goal of the criminal justice system. This new emphasis
on rehabilitation has garnered even stronger support for the abolition of capital punishment, for one cannot rehabilitate a dead criminal.
Berns attacks the rejection• of retribution in two ways. First, he
argues that modem reforms have failed to accomplish either of their
avowed purposes. Citing several studies (pp. 66-72), he argues that
we have never found a successful method of rehabilitating criminals.
Furthermore, says Berns, our attempts at rehabilitation have undermined our ability to deter crime. In fact, Berns argues, our present
system has little or no deterrent effect because only an extremely
small percentage of criminals ever face incarceration. 3
Bems's second attack is more basic. He contends that the spirit
of reform which has spawned the fight against capital punishment
has confused our attitudes toward the criminal law. The deterrence
and rehabilitation objectives of punishment concentrate on the criminal, not on the crime or its victim. With concern for deterring and
rehabilitating criminals has come indi.fference to the effects of crime.
According to Berns, the reform movement can only result in "a
world without dignity, without morality, and indifferent to how we
live [; a world] that may not impose the sentence of death on anyone
- or, for that matter, punish anyone in any manner - or ask any
3. According to Berns's calculations, ''98.3% of the serious crimes go unpunished." P. 112.
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patriot to die for it" (p. 163). The question Berns poses "is whether
we can live in such a country or in such a world" (p. 163).
Berns's solution is the reacceptance of anger as a response to
crime. He argues that anger is a proper response because crime does
more than simply disrupt the orderly functioning of society; it inflicts
personal injuries on individual victims and it violates the public trust
that is vital to "moral human communities." Berns rejects the
charge that anger is a selfish, brutal emotion, stating that it demonstrates our concern for crime victims. Furthermore, he asserts that a
system based on anger and retribution acknowledges the criminal's
humanity by recognizing his unique capacity to make moral
choices.4
If we accept the responses of anger and retribution, our schedule
of punishments must change. Since the purpose of punishment is to
vindicate the victim and impress upon the criminal and the community the seriousness of the particular transgression, the punishment
must fit the crime. Thus, for Berns, the most horrible crimes deserve
the most terrible punishment: death. Moreover, the criminal law
must command profound respect, and "the most powerful means we
have to give it that dignity is to authorize it to impose the ultimate
penalty" (p. 173). These reasons for the death penalty, however, militate against its widespread use, for it must be reserved for only the
most heinous crimes. Therefore, while denying that capital punishment is cruel, Berns asserts that capital punishment should be unusual.
While Berns cannot be faulted "for criticizing our present responses to crime, his critique is not always persuasive. One gets the
feeling that he does little more than throw in the towel with his argument against rehabilitation. He argues that our failure to rehabilitate criminals demands a new approach, ignoring the fact that
rehabilitation has been taken seriously for less than one hundred
years while the death penalty he proposes was a failure for centuries.
Secondly, Berns fails to answer one of the more potent arguments of
the abolitionists: that the death penalty cannot be administered
without caprice and mistake. 5 If that argument is correct, there i;nay
be no persuasive response to the observation that capital punishment
makes any mistakes in the judicial process permanent; an innocent
4. Berns is attempting to respond to Justice Brennan, who argues that the death penalty
does not "comport with human dignity" because it treats men as objects to be discarded, and
"even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of co=on human dignity."
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273-74 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). In addition to his
response that the penalty confers dignity by treating criminals as responsible moral beings,
Berns expresses doubt that men such as James Earl Ray, Charles Manson, and Adolph Eichman are truly deserving of the same respect as men such as Martin Luther King and Abraham
Lincoln.
5. See C. BLACK, CAPITAL PuN!SHMENT (1974).

March 1980]

For Capital Punishment

811

person, once. executed, cannot be resurrected. Even more serious,
however, is Berns's failure to answer the claims that the death penalty will be applied arbitrarily and discriminatorily. While he may
be able to limit the use of capital punishment to the worst crimes,
Berns makes no attempt to explain how it can be administered
equally to rich and poor or to black and white. ·If he cannot overcome this problem, Berns's solution only serves to facilitate the "procession of the weak and the poor and the helpless . . . to our jails
and our prisons and to their deaths." 6
Finally, we should note that Berns's argument for capital punishment is not completely new. More than fifty years ago, Judge Alfred
J. Talley took a similar position during a debate over the death penalty with Clarence Darrow: ''The object of punishment of crime . . .
must be vindicative - not vindicative in the sense of revengeful, but
it must be imposed so that the law and its majesty and sanctity may
be vindicated."7 Darrow's answer to the judge is as fitting and effective a response to For Capital Punishment as it was to his opponent:
If capital punishment would cure these dire evils that he tells us
about, why in the world should there be any more killing? We have
had it always. We have had it long enough. It should have been abolished long ago.
In the end, this question is simply one of the humane feelings
against the brutal feelings. One who likes to see suffering, out of what
he thinks is righteous indignation, or any other, will hold fast to capital
punishment. One who has sympathy, imagination, kindness and understanding, will hate it and detest it as he hates and detests death. 8

It is easy to throw up one's hands in frustration over the failures
of the criminal law and to propose a tougher response. Berns's eloquent attack on the status quo appeals to that frustration. The value
of his effort lies in the strength of his indictment and, ironically, in
the weakness of his solution. Anger and retribution are not new responses to crime. Berns inadequately answers the critics of these responses, and he does not explain why the death penalty would be
successful after years of failure. Of what benefit is delineating a
problem without advising a solution? The persuasiveness of the attacks on both lenient and harsh systems of punishment suggests that
Berns and the reformers he opposes are making a fundamental mistake. They assume that a properly administered criminal justice system can effectively treat crime. A criminal justice system cannot
cure crime because it treats only the symptoms and not the causes of
the problem. Berns's ease in criticizing the present system and difficulty in proposing an adequate alternative indicates that problems
6. C. DARROW, supra note 1, at 102.
1. Id. at 90.
8. Id. at 103.
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are inherent in any criminal justice system. This message, even if
unintended, makes his book well worth reading.

